Jan Stoop’s paper with Charles N. Noussair and Daan van Soest, is entitled “Cooperation in a Dynamic Fishing Game: A Framed Field Experiment.” Citation: Noussair, Charles N., Daan van Soest, and Jan Stoop. 2015. “Cooperation in a Dynamic Fishing Game: A Framed Field Experiment.” American Economic Review, 105(5): 408-13.
AbstractWe derive a dynamic theoretical model of renewable resource extraction. In the social optimum, maximum extraction occurs in the last period only, while in the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the resource is depleted immediately. The predictions are tested in a field experiment conducted at a recreational fishing pond. The subjects, experienced recreational fishermen, face a dynamic social dilemma, in which they risk depletion of the resource by overfishing. We find strong support for the Nash equilibrium. Fishermen exert as much effort in the last period as in preceding periods, and effort is independent of the stock of fish.
The paper Martijn coauthored with TI alumnus Dennie van Dolder, Colin Camerer and Richard Thaler is entitled “Standing United or Falling Divided? High Stakes Bargaining in a TV Game Show.” Citation: van Dolder, Dennie, Martijn J. van den Assem, Colin F. Camerer, and Richard H. Thaler. 2015. “Standing United or Falling Divided? High Stakes Bargaining in a TV Game Show.” American Economic Review, 105(5): 402-07.
AbstractWe examine high stakes three-person bargaining in a game show where contestants bargain over a large money amount that is split into three unequal shares. We find that individual behavior and outcomes are strongly influenced by equity concerns: those who contributed more to the jackpot claim larger shares, are less likely to make concessions, and take home larger amounts. Contestants who announce that they will not back down do well relative to others, but they do not secure larger absolute amounts and they harm others. There is no evidence of a first-mover advantage and little evidence that demographic characteristics matter.