Appointing the Most Able and Motivated Bureaucrats? The Role of Electoral Incentives
Dana Sisak
- Brown Bag Seminars General Economics
Dana Sisak
Jori Korpershoek
Luise Eisfeld (HEC Lausanne & Swiss Finance Institute, Switzerland), Bernhard Ganglmair (University of Mannheim), Axel Gautier (HEC Liège, France), Florian Szűcs (WU Vienna, Austria)
Thimo De Schouwer (KU Leuven), Maitreesh Ghatak (London School of Economics), Marc Kaufmann (Central European University), Michael Kosfeld (Goethe University Frankfurt), Dorothea Kübler (WZB), Nicola Lacetera (University of Bologna), Birthe Larsen (Copenhagen Business School), Gabriel Ramos (Imperial College London), Marta Serra-Garcia (University of California, San Diego), Oliver Spalt (University of Mannheim), Sili Zhang (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich), and Roberto Weber (University of Zürich)
Robert Dur
Thomas Breda (Paris School of Economics, France)
Faculty: Lia van Wesenbeeck and David Jackson